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I. INTRODUCTION
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,1 Brown v. Board of
Education,2 Gideon v. Wainwright,3 and Reynolds v. Sims4 are among the most
renowned cases in American history. Although controversial when decided,
these cases are now considered part of the essential fabric of American
constitutional law. Like the Constitution itself, these decisions have iconic
stature in our political culture. And like the Constitution itself, they are
celebrated as hallmarks of American liberty by both the left and the right.
Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds, however, share another trait. They
are products of progressive constitutionalism. They could not have been decided
* Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. I am grateful to Gene Nichol,
Richard Myers, Al Brophy, and Lou Bilionis for their comments on an earlier draft of this
Article and to Marc Macenko and Katherine Slager for their research assistance.
1 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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the way they were had the Court in those cases adhered to conservative theories
of constitutional interpretation such as originalism or judicial restraint. Barnette,
Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds therefore raise potential challenges to the
viability of conservative constitutional theory. Generally, the validity of an
interpretive theory should rest on its internal merits, not its external results. But
if a particular theory cannot explain decisions that are universally considered to
be both correct and integral to the American system of justice, the question
necessarily arises as to whether there is something lacking in that theoretical
account.
This Article explores the significance of Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and
Reynolds as a basis for evaluating theories of progressive and conservative
constitutionalism as methods of constitutional interpretation, focusing most
specifically on the relationship between these decisions and originalism. Does
the universal acceptance of these cases as hallmarks of American liberty suggest
that a method of constitutional interpretation, such as originalism, that rejects
these decisions is thereby inherently flawed?
Part II of this Article provides the necessary background by outlining what
is meant by progressive and conservative constitutionalism. Part III examines
Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds and explains how the decisions follow
from progressive, but not conservative, constitutionalism. Part IV then takes a
closer look at the relationship between the four decisions and originalism. The
section first investigates whether the decisions can be reconciled with
originalism as either appropriate exceptions to the originalist account or as
precedents that are so deeply embedded in constitutional culture that they might
escape originalist scrutiny. Concluding that such reconciliation is unlikely, the
section then tackles the central question: What do non-originalist decisions such
as Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds reflect about the legitimacy of
originalism as an interpretive theory?

II. CONSERVATIVE AND PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Conservative Constitutionalism
Conservative constitutionalism has two primary strands.5 The classic
version is judicial restraint, in which courts are seen to have only a limited role
in constitutional decision making.6 This strand of conservative thought was

5 For a detailed discussion of the differing meanings of “conservative,” see Ernest A.
Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1181–1203
(2002). This Article employs the more commonly understood uses of the term in relation to
approaches to constitutional interpretation.
6 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
314–15 (1996); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 207–08,
211 (1985); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Is There a Distinctive Conservative Jurisprudence?, 73
U. COLO. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (2002).
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most prominent in the years after the Warren Court7 and in the wake of such
controversial cases as Roe v. Wade.8 In reaction to such decisions,
conservatives9 argued that the Court should be far more deferential to political
actors.10 As the judicial constraint conservatives saw it, judicial invalidation of
the acts of elected officials was improperly counter-majoritarian because it
substituted the decisions of courts for the decisions of the people acting through
their representatives.11
Perhaps recognizing that too great a commitment to restraint abdicates the
essential role of the courts,12 conservatives in the 1980s, led by Robert Bork,
Edwin Meese, and Antonin Scalia, developed a second strand of conservative
constitutionalism that quickly became dominant in conservative legal thought.13
That theory, of course, is “originalism.”14 Under this theory, courts should
exercise judicial restraint unless the “original meaning” of the text requires

7 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U.

ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2012) (manuscript at 14–18) (on file with the Ohio State Law
Journal) (discussing conservative political reaction to the Warren Court).
8 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9 To be sure, this criticism was also joined by some liberals. See ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
208–09 (1962).
10 Id. at 214–15. It is worth noting that in addition to their being inconsistent with
originalism, Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds are also in tension with the principle of
judicial restraint because all four cases overturned the decisions of politically accountable
bodies. See infra Part III.
11 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that courts should not create new rights because they are “impatient of democratic
change”).
12 See Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, The Framers’ Constitution,
2011,
at
61,
62–63,
available
at
DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS, Summer
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/21/the_framers_constitution.pdf
(“The
Framers
intended courts to play a central role in addressing these concerns. When proponents of the
original Constitution argued in 1789 that a bill of rights would be pointless because political
majorities would run roughshod over its guarantees, Thomas Jefferson responded that this
argument ignored ‘the legal check’ that could be exercised by the judiciary. When James
Madison faced similar concerns when he introduced the Bill of Rights in the first Congress,
he maintained that ‘independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves . . . the
guardians of those rights [and] . . . will be naturally led to resist every encroachment’ upon
them. And in Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton stated that constitutional protections and
limitations could ‘be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts
of justice,’ which must ‘guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects
of those ill humours which . . . sometimes disseminate among the people themselves.’” ).
13 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 82–83 (1990); Edwin Meese, III,
The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L.
REV. 455, 464 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
862 (1989).
14 See generally ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi
ed., 2007).
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judicial intervention.15 Such an approach, conservatives argue, both sets forth
the Constitution as a document that creates binding law16 and constrains judges
from using the law to effectuate policy preferences.17 (Because originalism now
holds such preeminence in conservative legal thought, this Article refers to that
strand of conservative constitutionalism unless otherwise noted.)

B. Progressive Constitutionalism
There are probably as many accounts of progressive constitutionalism as
there are progressives,18 and I do not pretend to offer the definitive account
here. In presenting the progressive account, however, I will rely on an essay
entitled The Framers’ Constitution19 that Geoffrey Stone and I recently
published because it presents an approach that is commonly associated with the
progressive account.20
The constitutional theory that we identify has two major components. The
first traces back almost two centuries to Chief Justice John Marshall when he
stated in McCulloch v. Maryland21 that “we must never forget, that it is a
constitution we are expounding,”22 and it is “intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.”23 As Marshall recognized, the Framers were visionaries who
understood that the application of the principles they established would
necessarily evolve over time. Accordingly, they strived “to establish the
foundational principles that would sustain and guide the new nation into an
uncertain future,”24 and were not, as the originalist account implies, so
shortsighted that they sought “only to address the specific challenges facing the
15 Scalia, supra note 13, at 854.
16 Id.
17 See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2576 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18 Cf. P.J. O’BRIEN, WILL ROGERS: AMBASSADOR OF GOOD WILL, PRINCE OF WIT AND

WISDOM 162 (1935) (quoting Will Rogers’s famous line, “I am not a member of any
organized party—I am a Democrat.”).
19 Stone & Marshall, supra note 12, at 61. I use The Framers’ Constitution with some
trepidation because our effort in authoring the piece was not to create a theory of
“progressive constitutionalism” as much as it was to identify the theory that most accurately
captures the Constitution’s design and purpose. I understand, however, that those not swayed
to the notion that our essay accurately reflects the Framers’ vision might be inclined to view
our account as progressive.
20 For a progressive theory of constitutionalism based upon originalist principles, see
James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA.
L. REV. 1523 (2011). See also Doug Kendall & Jim Ryan, The Case for New Textualism,
J.
IDEAS,
Summer
2011,
at
66,
71,
available
at
DEMOCRACY:
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/21/the_case_for_new_textualism.pdf.
21 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22 Id. at 407.
23 Id. at 415.
24 Stone & Marshall, supra note 12, at 61.
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nation during their lifetimes.”25 For this reason, Geoffrey Stone and I suggest,
the Framers deliberately used broad language such as “freedom of speech,”26
“due process of law,”27 and “equal protection of the laws”28 in order to entrust
“future generations [with] the responsibility to draw upon their intelligence,
judgment, and experience to give concrete meaning to these broad principles
over time.”29 The first component of progressive constitutionalism then is the
understanding that “[t]he principles enshrined in the Constitution do not change
over time. But the application of those principles must evolve as society
changes and as experience informs our understanding.”30
The second component of The Framers’ Constitution addresses how courts
should provide concrete meaning to the Constitution’s open-textured provisions.
Proceeding from Chief Justice Marshall’s understanding in McCulloch, as well
as the Court’s decision in Carolene Products31 and the work of John Hart Ely,32
Stone and I contend that this answer has two elements. First, because the
Constitution is based upon principles of democratic government, “courts must
generally defer to the preferences of the majority.”33 Second, when there are
specific reasons to question majoritarian action, such as laws that adversely
affect minorities who may otherwise not have a fair chance to succeed in the
democratic process, or laws that call into question the legitimacy of the
democratic processes themselves, heightened judicial scrutiny is required.34
25 Id.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27 Id. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
28 Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be

narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within
the Fourteenth. It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . Nor
need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at
particular religious, or national, or racial minorities[;] whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” (internal citations omitted)).
32 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 3–
9, 135–36 (1980).
33 Stone & Marshall, supra note 12, at 62.
34 Id. (“[R]espect for the Framers’ Constitution requires us to recognize that although
the Framers thought majority rule to be the best system of government, they knew it to be
imperfect. They understood that political majorities may be tempted to enact laws that
entrench their own authority; that in times of crisis people may panic and too readily
sacrifice both fundamental freedoms and structural limitations; and that prejudice, hostility,
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Progressive constitutionalism, then, is based upon the understanding of when
the democratic process requires judicial intervention. In most circumstances,
judicial intrusion is not necessary. But when the product of the democratic
processes may be suspect, judicial involvement is required.

C. Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism Contrasted
The previous discussions might suggest that progressive constitutionalism
has more in common with its conservative counterparts than is normally
thought. First, like the conservatives’ judicial restraint account, progressive
constitutionalism recognizes the constitutional importance of courts deferring to
the actions of elected officials. It only suggests that courts should also be
attuned to when such deference is not warranted. Second, like originalism,
progressive constitutionalism recognizes that the principles enshrined in the
Constitution are constant. Unlike originalism, however, progressive
constitutionalism recognizes that fulfilling the Framers’ vision requires
recognizing that the application of those principles may change over time.
Some commentators have described this difference as essentially one
involving levels of abstraction.35 Conservatives interpret constitutional
provisions at a relatively narrow level of abstraction, tying their analyses to
close readings of the text and so-called original meaning, while progressives
interpret the provisions in light of broader principles.36 But the difference
between the two approaches can be very substantial. Consider the question of
whether the Equal Protection Clause should apply to women. Conservatives
such as Justice Scalia argue that it should not because the record is relatively
clear that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to include
women within its protections.37 Progressives, in contrast, look to the
and intolerance may at times lead governing majorities to give short shrift to the legitimate
needs and interests of political, religious, racial, and other minorities.”).
35 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential
Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1084–85
(1981); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1926–28 (1995).
36 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) (“For the genius of the Constitution rests
not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.”).
37 Justice Scalia made this point recently in an interview with Hastings law professor
Calvin Massey:
Certainly the Constitution does not require discrimination on the basis of sex. The only
issue is whether it prohibits it. It doesn’t. Nobody ever thought that that’s what it meant.
Nobody ever voted for that. If the current society wants to outlaw discrimination by sex,
hey we have things called legislatures, and they enact things called laws. You don’t
need a constitution to keep things up-to-date. All you need is a legislature and a ballot
box.
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commitment to equality expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment and conclude
that, in a society in which the gender distinctions that prevailed in nineteenth
century America no longer exist, the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to
equality cannot be fulfilled unless it is interpreted to include women.38

III. BARNETTE, BROWN, GIDEON, AND REYNOLDS
One of the most trenchant conservative criticisms of progressive
constitutionalism is that it is driven by results.39 Liberal judges, according to
this critique, are less interested in applying the rule of law than in reaching
decisions they believe to be just or compassionate.40 This approach, it is argued,
suffers from two central infirmities. First, it is not properly described as law
because it is not driven by rules.41 Second, it overly empowers the unelected
members of the judiciary to substitute their beliefs as to what is just or
compassionate for those of democratically elected actors.42
As it turns out, despite their protestations, the accusation of result-oriented
jurisprudence can be as easily directed at conservatives.43 Cases such as
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,44 striking down federal affirmative
action,45 or Citizens United v. FEC,46 finding a First Amendment right of
corporations to spend unlimited funds to influence elections,47 for example,
cannot be supported either by principles of judicial restraint48 or by any
comprehensible theory of originalism.49 Yet both anti-affirmative action and
The Originalist, CAL. LAW., Dec. 2010–Jan. 2011, at 33, 33, available at
http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=913358&evid=1 (selected transcript of interview
with Justice Antonin Scalia).
38 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (The equal protection
principle requires that women have “equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and
contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities.”).
39 See Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 283, 287 (1996).
40 See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Why Conservative Jurisprudence Is Compassionate, 89
VA. L. REV. 753, 757 (2003).
41 Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2576 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42 Id.
43 E.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 89 (2009);
William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1217, 1223 (2002). Even some conservatives appear to share this assessment. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 245 (1995) (“[O]riginalism is the legal profession’s
orthodox mode of justification.”); BeVier, supra note 39, at 287 (suggesting that
conservatives should be consistent).
44 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
45 Id. at 230.
46 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
47 Id. at 886.
48 In both cases, the Court invalidated the actions of an elected body.
49 The easy answer to the conservatives’ assertion in Adarand that federal affirmative
action is unconstitutional is that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the federal
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anti-campaign finance regulation are core features of the conservatives’
constitutional agenda.50
But the failure of conservatives to live up to their own critique does not
dispel that critique’s legitimacy. The implication that courts are guided only by
outcomes is inconsistent with the rule of law because it suggests legal decision
making is based upon the variable of a judge’s individual choice.51 Further, if
there is no “law” outside judges’ outcome preferences, there is no reason why
the decisions of unelected judges should prevail over the decisions of elected
actors.52
Nevertheless, simply because results alone should not control constitutional
decision making does not mean they are irrelevant to assessing the validity of a
constitutional theory.53 Suppose one constitutional theory leads to a set of
government. There is also no historical evidence indicating that the Framers of the original
constitutional or the Civil War Amendments were concerned with preventing federal racial
discrimination. E.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 432 (1997);
Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An
Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 590 (1998).
Similarly, in Citizens United, there is no basis from which to assert that the original
meaning of the First Amendment included the right of corporations to spend unlimited funds
to influence federal elections. The Framers greatly distrusted corporations. See Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 949 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It was ‘assumed that [corporations] were
legally privileged organizations that had to be closely scrutinized by the legislature because
their purposes had to be made consistent with public welfare.’” (quoting RONALD E.
SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784–1855, at 5 (1982));
1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2:3 (3d ed. 2010)
(noting that corporate charters were very limited and the activities of corporations tightly
monitored during the founding era).
50 Other examples of result-oriented conservative jurisprudence include Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, in which Justice Scalia argued that his rule prohibiting regulatory
takings was supported by something he termed “constitutional culture,” 505 U.S. 1003, 1028
(1992), and Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, which recognized a theory of judicial takings although the Framers of the
Takings Clause would have never recognized the principle, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601–02 (2010)
(plurality opinion).
51 As Judge Richard Posner has noted, “If changing judges changes law, it is not even
clear what law is.” RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 1 (2008).
52 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004); James B. Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 134–35
(1893). But see Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of
Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 855
(2008) (contending that judicial review performs the institutional function of providing an
additional check on government action).
53 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 168–69
(1986) (contending that outcome is not irrelevant to legitimacy). Of course, as a practical
matter, as Sandy Levinson tells us, “When all is said and done, we place far greater
emphasis on whether we substantively like the outcomes, than on their legal pedigree.”
Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the Emancipation
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results that are broadly conceived to be not only correct but also landmark
decisions reflecting the best of the American justice system, while another
theory would suggest that those cases were wrongly decided. Does that set of
results reflect upon the validity of the underlying theories? Should it? Focusing
upon Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds as representative examples,54 the
following sections examine these issues.

A. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943)
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette55 is rightly celebrated as
one of the greatest First Amendment decisions in American history.56
Addressing no less an incendiary issue than American patriotism, Barnette held
that, under the Free Speech Clause, Jehovah’s Witnesses could not be
compelled to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance in the public
schools.57 The fact that the case was decided at the height of World War II only
added to the strength and courage of the decision.
Barnette stands as a landmark decision for a number of reasons. First, the
case is a testament to our Nation’s commitment to freedom of speech even in
the most dire circumstances such as war.58 Second, the decision is the first to
recognize that the right to speak should include the right to not speak.59 As the
Court explained, compelled speech “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
Proclamation Constitutional? Do We/Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1135, 1150.
54 Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds do not present an exhaustive list. There are
numerous other landmark Supreme Court decisions that cannot be readily justified on
originalist grounds but are nonetheless considered unassailable. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (ruling that the Due Process Clause requires that the state must prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967)
(holding that anti-miscegenation laws violate equal protection); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (finding a right of marital privacy); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (concluding that First Amendment protections apply to
libel suits between private parties); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 203–04 (1962) (determining
that redistricting cases are justiciable); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35
(1925) (deciding that parents have a constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their
children). I selected Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds for discussion in this Article,
however, because they are particularly illustrative in demonstrating the tension between
originalism and landmark cases.
55 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
56 Gregory L. Peterson et al., Recollections of West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 755, 755 (2007).
57 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
58 For a less sanguine analysis of America’s commitment to free speech during times of
crisis, see generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
59 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634 (stating that freedom of speech must not protect just the
right of the individual to “speak his own mind” but also the right of the individual to be free
from compulsion “to utter what is not in his mind”).
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which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve
from all official control.”60 Third, Barnette stands for the powerful proposition
that the government may not impose a forced orthodoxy on its citizenry.61 As
Justice Jackson wrote:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us.62

Justice Jackson’s opinion in Barnette has been described as “one of the
greatest statements on civil liberties ever written.”63 But it was not originalist.
The text of the First Amendment mentions only the right to speak and not the
right not to speak.64 Furthermore, there is no historical evidence of which I am
aware that suggests that the Framers of either the First or Fourteenth
Amendments would have found compelled speech to be constitutionally
problematic. The Constitution, for example, forbids religious test oaths for
public office65 and compelled self-incrimination66 but does not impose any
other restrictions on compulsory speech. The Fourteenth Amendment, in turn,
was enacted against a background of loyalty oaths being imposed on Southern
citizens67 and public schools having compulsory prayer.68 There is little to
suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers would have seen these
practices as unconstitutional.

60 Id. at 642.
61 Id. The decision is further notable in that, in so deciding, the Court overturned a

decision less than three years old. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599–
600 (1940).
62 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
63 KERMIT L. HALL & JOHN J. PATRICK, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS THAT SHAPED AMERICA 101 (2006).
64 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
65 Id. art. VI (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States.”).
66 Id. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled . . . to be a witness against
himself . . . .”).
67 See HAROLD MELVIN HYMAN, ERA OF THE OATH: NORTHERN LOYALTY TESTS
DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 13 (1954) (discussing post-Civil War loyalty
oaths).
68 See Harold J. Berman, Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical
Perspective, 35 EMORY L.J. 777, 782 (1986) (noting that in the nineteenth century, “[s]tate
colleges and universities as well as elementary and secondary schools required the reading
of the Bible and singing of hymns and saying of prayers”); see also Donahoe v. Richards, 38
Me. 379, 413 (1854) (upholding the school board’s expulsion of a Catholic student from
public school for refusing to read a Protestant translation of the Bible).
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Barnette, however, is consistent with progressive constitutionalism. First, it
follows from Carolene Products in at least two respects: it protects religious
minorities,69 and it protects freedom of speech, the freedom that goes directly to
the ability of the democratic processes to effectuate political change.70 Indeed,
some writers have noted that Chief Justice Stone’s dissent in Gobitis, the case
that Barnette overturned, was actually an extension of the Carolene Products
opinion that he had authored the previous year.71
Second, Barnette exemplifies progressive constitutionalism in that it shows
how societal experience can lead to changes in how freedom of speech
principles are applied. The idea that “[n]ational unity is the basis of national
security”72 may seem innocuous as a justification for requiring school children
to salute the flag. But this rationale takes on an entirely different connotation in
the face of a war against a totalitarian regime. Against the background of
Nazism, the reason why compelled flag salutes are such a threat to individual
freedom becomes graphically clear.73 Accordingly, under this understanding,
when Barnette strikes down compulsory flag salutes (even though an originalist
would not do so), it is not rewriting the First Amendment. It is instead
recognizing that applications of the First Amendment must change to
accommodate the lessons learned through the experience of history.

B. Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
The centrality of Brown v. Board of Education74 to our constitutional
system is, of course, indisputable, and its significance cannot be overstated. As
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson states, “Brown may be the most important political,
social, and legal event in America’s twentieth-century history. Its greatness lay
in the enormity of injustice it condemned, in the entrenched sentiment it

69 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that
heightened scrutiny should be applied to statutes directed at religious minorities).
70 Id. (noting that heightened scrutiny should be applied to “legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation,” such as “restrictions upon the right to vote,” “restraints upon the
dissemination of information,” “interferences with political organizations,” and prohibitions
“of peaceable assembly”); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 63 (1948) (noting the critical role of freedom of speech in
self-government).
71 Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 409, 418 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009).
72 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940).
73 The Barnette Court’s concern with totalitarianism may not have been the only factor
that influenced its decision. The Court may also have been affected by the outbreak of
vigilante violence against the Jehovah’s Witnesses that took place in the wake of Gobitis.
See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 71, at 420–21.
74 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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challenged, in the immensity of law it both created and overthrew.”75 As such,
the decision is rightly celebrated as having “epoch-making significance in the
evolution of constitutional democracy.”76
The legal correctness of the decision is also beyond dispute. As Stephen
Carter states, “Brown is the single unimpeachable opinion of our times; no
constitutional theory that denies its correctness will be admitted to the
mainstream.”77 Indeed, the case has become so central to our understanding of
race and equal protection that the Court’s recent debate over whether a city
program designed to promote integration in its public schools was
unconstitutional was reasoned more on the basis of whether that program was
consistent with Brown than whether the program was consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause.78
Unlike the other cases discussed in this section, some commentators have
attempted to argue that Brown can be explained on originalist grounds. The
consensus among legal scholars and academics, however, is that these efforts
have not succeeded.79 Consider the efforts of Robert Bork. In The Tempting of
America, Bork concedes that “[t]he inescapable fact is that those who ratified
the amendment did not think it outlawed segregated education or segregation in
any aspect of life.”80 But recognizing the moral rightness of the decision, Bork
goes on to argue that Brown’s result was nevertheless compelled by the original

75 J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954–1978, at 6 (1979).
76 Alfred H. Kelly, The School Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED
THE CONSTITUTION 307, 333 (John A. Garraty ed., 1987).
77 Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux, or How the Tempting of America Led the People to
Rise and Battle for Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 759, 777 (1991); see also Jamal Greene, How
Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1183 (2011).
78 Compare Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, which cites Brown for the proposition that race
cannot be used to assign children to the public schools, 551 U.S. 701, 746–47 (2007), with
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion contending that the Chief Justice fundamentally
misunderstood the Brown decision, id. at 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., Joel
K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice Roberts’s Reinterpretation of
Brown, 69 OHIO. ST. L.J. 791, 792–93 (2008) (noting the efforts of the majority opinion in
Parents Involved to tie its conclusion that benign race-based classifications were
impermissible to the principles enunciated in Brown); Mark A. Graber, The Price of Fame:
Brown as Celebrity, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 939, 1004–06 (2008) (noting more broadly the
attempts of the Justices to rely heavily on Brown in deciding equal protection cases).
79 See Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 411, 436 (1998). Ironically, as David Strauss argues, the conservatives may face
a greater problem in defending originalism if they had successfully demonstrated that Brown
was compelled by originalist principles. David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be
Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 969, 971 (2008). If so, Strauss asks, then why did
it take so long after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment for the Court to uncover the
originalist understanding? Id.
80 BORK, supra note 13, at 75–76.
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understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.81 But
where does that original understanding come from if the conclusion that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers did not intend to outlaw segregation was
“inescapable”? Bork’s answer is that it was clear by the time Brown was
decided that “segregation rarely if ever produced equality,” so the Court had to
step in to further equality goals.82 In other words, Bork argues that the meaning
of equality had to be reinterpreted in light of the understanding of equality of
the society at the time of the Brown decision rather than the understanding that
existed at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. The notion
that the meanings of constitutional provisions change over time, however, is not
originalism.83
Although Brown cannot be readily defended on originalist grounds, if at all,
it is easily characterized as an example of progressive constitutionalism. To
begin with, it stands as virtually the paradigm case under Carolene Products
because it addresses government action directed against racial minorities84 and,
in fact, Brown has been described in the literature as such.85
It also stands as a paradigmatic case as to how the meaning of constitutional
provisions can change as societal circumstances evolve. Racial segregation had
always been reprehensible but its grotesqueness became even clearer after a war
81 Id. at 82.
82 Id.
83 Michael McConnell has also attempted to defend Brown on originalist grounds.

Focusing on congressional debates in the 1870s concerning the passage of the Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1875, McConnell demonstrates that many of the legislators who voted for the
Fourteenth Amendment subsequently supported school desegregation. See Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 984–86
(1995). As Michael Klarman explains, however, there are a number of weaknesses in
McConnell’s argument that this evidence establishes that the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited segregation. Klarman, supra note 35, at 1884. First, the
debates over the Civil Rights Act were not contemporaneous with the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and there may have been some change in sentiment between the
proposal of the Fourteenth in 1866 and the votes on the Civil Rights Act in 1875. Id. Second,
McConnell does not explain why the key evidence in determining the underlying intent of
the Fourteenth Amendment should be congressional votes on a subsequent statute rather than
an account of popular sentiment regarding segregation or the beliefs of the state legislators
who ratified the amendment. Id. Third, McConnell looks only at the congressional members’
statements of legal principle rather than the actual practice of segregation that existed at the
time. Id. Fourth, Klarman argues that it is not clear that the language debated in the Civil
Rights Act providing that blacks could not be denied “full and equal enjoyment” meant
mandatory desegregation. Id.
84 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that
heightened judicial scrutiny should be applied to statutes directed at particular religious,
national, or racial minorities).
85 See David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251,
1251 (“The theory of the Carolene Products footnote unifies some of the greatest successes
in the Court’s history: Brown v. Board of Education, the ‘one person, one vote’ decisions,
and the expansion of the free speech rights of political dissidents.”).
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in which American soldiers of all colors fought in common cause against an
enemy defined by its commitment to racial subordination.86 If the meaning of
equal protection of the laws had ever supported a notion of separate but equal, it
could not continue do to so in post-World War II America.87 Equality could no
longer be understood to mean “separate but equal” because the meaning of
equality had changed.

C. Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
In Gideon v. Wainwright,88 the Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment requires that criminal defendants be given state-appointed
counsel.89 Gideon is the stuff of legend. The case’s compelling facts—the story
of an innocent prisoner litigating his own case90—inspired both a book91 and a
motion picture.92
But the significance of the case extends far beyond the story’s drama.93 The
case has become the central decision in our conception of American justice. As
David Cole explains:
86 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT

STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 174 (2004) (“[R]evulsion against fascism had
impelled many Americans to reconsider the meaning of democracy, with unavoidable racial
implications. The commitment of Nazis to Aryan supremacy helped ‘give racism a bad
name’ in the United States.”).
87 By the time of Brown, President Truman had already ordered the desegregation of
the U.S. Armed Forces. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948).
88 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
89 Id. at 342–43.
90 Clarence Earl Gideon was arrested and charged with breaking and entering with
intent to commit petty larceny based only on one witness’s testimony. See Anthony Lewis,
The Case of the Florida Drifter, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 76, at 335, 335–36. He requested a court-appointed attorney and was denied. Id. He
defended himself and was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. Id. Using the
prison library, he hand-wrote his appeals to the Supreme Court. See id. at 341–42. He was
then assigned a prominent attorney (Abe Fortas) for the appeal who later became a Supreme
Court Justice. Id. When Gideon was later tried with the assistance of a court-appointed
lawyer, he was acquitted. See id. at 347.
91 ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964).
92 Hallmark Hall of Fame: Gideon’s Trumpet (Hallmark Hall of Fame Productions
Apr. 30, 1980). Details about the motion picture may be found at Gideon’s Trumpet,
INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0080789/ (last visited Sept. 10,
2011).
93 Geoffrey Hazard, for example, described the case as the leading decision of the
1960s—a decade that included, among others, Miranda, the reapportionment cases, the
school prayer decisions, and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Hazard, supra note 53, at 157.
To be sure, Chief Justice Warren may not have agreed with Professor Hazard’s assessment
that Gideon was the most important case of the 1960s, as Warren is noted to have stated that
the reapportionment cases were the most significant of his tenure. HALL & PATRICK, supra
note 63, at 139.
AND THE
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[T]he right recognized in Gideon is critical to perhaps the central premise of
the American criminal justice system—the promise of equal treatment. As long
as the rich could hire lawyers and the poor had to do without, the promise that
all are “equal before the law” was patently illusory.94

To be sure, Gideon did not create a right to court-appointed counsel from
whole cloth. Powell v. Alabama95 had suggested that such a right existed in
capital cases,96 and Betts v. Brady97 indicated that a right to counsel might exist
depending upon the circumstances of the case.98 Moreover, because Johnson v.
Zerbst99 had already held that there was a right to court-appointed counsel in
federal cases,100 the actual question in Gideon was only the relatively narrow
issue of whether that right should be incorporated to apply against the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment.101 Gideon, of course, held that it did.102
Although enjoying some precedential support, Gideon was not
originalist.103 The Sixth Amendment’s provision allowing a right to counsel
was enacted in response to an English common law rule that had provided that
felons could not have counsel,104 not that the state had an affirmative obligation
to provide such counsel.105 Any right to court-appointed counsel, as the Court
had noted in Betts, “was dealt with by statute rather than constitutional
provision,” and even at that there were very few instances where such assistance
was provided.106
Gideon, however, is another instance of progressive constitutionalism. To
be sure, the class of criminal defendants that the case represents is not explicitly
mentioned in Carolene Products. But it does comfortably fit within the
94 David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington: Broken Promises,
in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 101, 102 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
95 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
96 See id. at 71.
97 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
98 Id. at 473.
99 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
100 Id. at 463.
101 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
102 Id. at 341.
103 Perhaps, for this reason, the conservative endorsement of Gideon has not always
been whole-hearted. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1495 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Even assuming the validity of [Gideon], I reject the significant further
extension that the Court, and to a lesser extent the concurrence, would create.” (emphasis
added)).
104 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932) (“Originally, in England, a person
charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel, except in respect of legal
questions which the accused himself might suggest.”).
105 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Sixth Amendment as
originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to employ counsel,
or to use volunteered services of counsel.” (citing United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169,
173 (1891))).
106 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 467 (1942).
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Carolene Products description of the type of discrete and insular minority
entitled to heightened judicial review.107 As Geoffrey Hazard argues, Gideon
involved the legal claim of a person “in a legally second class position, a
position that was the product of social disparagement reinforced by legal
institutions.”108
Gideon also reflects the progressive understanding of how constitutional
guarantees should be applied to meet existing conditions. The record in Gideon
indicated that the defendant may not have been convicted if he had had the
services of a lawyer because he (Gideon) did not raise objections to the
prosecution’s evidence or take other procedural actions that would have
benefitted his case in his self-representation. 109 Gideon’s conviction, in short,
was based more on his lack of resources than whether he was guilty or innocent.
The broad question the case posed before the Court, then, was whether the
fairness of the American justice system should rest on whether a defendant had
the ability to hire a lawyer. The Court held that it could not: “[R]eason and
reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. . . . [L]awyers in criminal
courts are necessities, not luxuries.”110
As noted above, this understanding of what was required for a fair trial was
not originalist. Indeed, Gideon’s counsel, Abe Fortas, did not even attempt to
contend otherwise.111 It did, however, reflect reality. As Anthony Lewis writes,
“originally the Sixth Amendment was almost certainly not designed to reach the
problem of a person too poor to retain a lawyer. But by the twentieth century
that was the problem.”112 At the time of Gideon’s appeal, for example, 5093 of
the 7836 prisoners in custody in Florida had been tried without the benefit of
counsel.113 The adversary system upon which American justice is based, in
short, could not accurately be characterized as fair—or even adversarial—
because only the prosecution’s side had the necessary resources.114 As such, the
actual state of the American justice system did not reflect the principles of
fairness and equality before the law that the Constitution requires.115 Gideon,
then, sought to promote fealty to these principles by requiring a right to counsel
even though there was no originalist basis to do so.116

107 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (stating that
heightened scrutiny should apply to legislation directed at discrete and insular minorities).
108 Hazard, supra note 53, at 157.
109 See Lewis, supra note 90, at 342.
110 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
111 Lewis, supra note 90, at 346.
112 Id. at 338.
113 Id. at 343.
114 See id. at 344.
115 See id.
116 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
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D. Reynolds v. Sims (1964)
Reynolds v. Sims117 adopted the principle of one person, one vote118 as the
central legal framework from which to evaluate the constitutionality of
legislative apportionment,119 and in doing so rewrote the rules of American
democracy.120 Along with its companion cases, Reynolds called into question
ninety percent of the districts in the federal House of Representatives and a vast
majority of the seats in all of the state legislatures.121
Not surprisingly, the decision was highly controversial. Everett Dirksen, the
highly respected Republican Senate Leader, for example, proposed that the case
be overturned by constitutional amendment.122 But the outcry over Reynolds
was relatively short-lived. As Lucas Powe notes, “Reynolds went from
debatable in 1964 to unquestionable in 1968.”123 And today, as David Strauss
writes, “‘one person, one vote’ might seem like a natural, even inevitable
requirement of the Constitution.”124
Reynolds, however, cannot be defended on originalist grounds. As Justice
Harlan stated in his dissent:
The history of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
conclusive evidence that neither those who proposed nor those who ratified the
Amendment believed that the Equal Protection Clause limited the power of the
States to apportion their legislatures as they saw fit. Moreover, the history
demonstrates that the intention to leave this power undisturbed was deliberate
and was widely believed to be essential to the adoption of the Amendment.125

Harlan’s point is well-taken. To begin with, state legislative districts were
not equally apportioned at the time of the passage of the Fourteenth

117 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
118 See id. at 568. Reynolds does not actually use the term “one person, one vote” in its

opinion, although that is the effect of its ruling. The actual language actually comes from a
different case, Gray v. Sanders, in which the Court stated: “The conception of political
equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person,
one vote.” 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
119 Gray, 372 U.S. at 380–81.
120 See Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 71, at 271, 296 (Reynolds, when decided, “was
an earth-shattering decision.”). Equally significant to Reynolds in reframing the American
electoral landscape was Baker v. Carr, the precursor case to Reynolds holding that
reapportionment issues were justiciable. 369 U.S. 186, 203–04 (1962).
121 Ansolabehere & Issacharoff, supra note 120, at 296.
122 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 254 (2000).
123 Id. at 255.
124 Strauss, supra note 85, at 1260.
125 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 595 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Amendment, and that did not appear to raise any constitutional concern.126 State
legislators, moreover, were also not likely to vote to ratify a constitutional
amendment that would place their seats at risk.
Equally significantly, the structure of the Constitution itself makes it clear
that one person, one vote was not in the original design.127 The United States
Senate, for example, is not apportioned according to population. This means
that a voter in Wyoming, according to the recent census, will have sixty-six
times more voting power over who becomes her next senator than will a voter
of the state of California.128 Similarly, neither the Electoral College system129
nor the Twelfth Amendment’s provision governing the election of the President
when no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes130 meets one
person, one vote standards.
Finally, Reynolds is also not originalist in that it is not even clear that the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that it even applied to voting.
After all, if the Fourteenth Amendment protected the right of every citizen to
vote equally, there would have been no need to promulgate the Fifteenth
Amendment.131 Reynolds, then, according to the originalists, must assuredly be
wrong.132
But Reynolds v. Sims is correct under progressive constitutionalism. To
begin with, it involves the problem with majoritarian entrenchment specifically

126 Strauss, supra note 85, at 1260. As Justice Harlan stated: “Can it be seriously

contended that the legislatures of these States, almost two-thirds of those concerned, would
have ratified an amendment which might render their own States’ constitutions
unconstitutional?” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 603 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
127 The Senate apportionment set forth in the original Constitution was reaffirmed by the
Seventeenth Amendment, which in providing for the direct election of senators by the
people, continued to apportion two senators for each state. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
128 As of the 2010 census, Wyoming has a population of 563,626 and California has
37,253,956 people, but both states have the same number of senators. See Resident
Population Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/
apportionment-pop-text.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).
129 South Dakota’s three electoral votes for a population of 814,180 give it more voting
power in the Electoral College per capita than does the state of Texas with a population of
25,145,561 and thirty-eight votes in the Electoral College. Hence, a voter in South Dakota,
under the Electoral College, has over twice the voting power as a voter in Texas. See id.
130 The Twelfth Amendment provides that if no presidential candidate received a
majority of electoral votes, the election is sent to the House of Representatives where each
state is entitled to one vote. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. This means that California and
Wyoming will have exactly the same voting power to elect the President despite their
difference in population.
131 See id. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”).
132 See BORK, supra note 13, at 89–90 (stating that one person, one vote was
“illegitimate constitutional law”).
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addressed in the Carolene Products footnote.133 The political reality is that
legislators would likely never remedy the process that solidifies their hold on
their seats without external judicial involvement.134
Furthermore, Reynolds, like Brown, is an example of the Court responding
to changes in the meaning of equality triggered by societal change. The idea
that voting equality could mean one person, one vote would not have been
apparent to the Framers. There were too many restrictions on the franchise. At
the time of the framing, for example, the right to vote was limited by numerous
criteria such as race, gender, age, and property ownership, meaning that a major
portion of even the white male population could not vote.135 Women did not
receive the right to vote until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in
1920.136 African-Americans, meanwhile, were not given the right to vote until
1870 through the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment.137 But even then this
right was more theoretical than real. Because of the black disenfranchisement
that occurred throughout the South in the late nineteenth century,138 the actual
right of blacks to vote was not truly secured until the 1960s.139
The achievement of universal suffrage that culminated in the 1960s,
however, did more than expand the franchise. It also made the voting disparities
inherent in malappropriation more obvious. If every person had the right to
vote, then it followed from the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause that all
persons should be entitled to vote equally. One person, one vote may not have
been originalist, but it did reflect the most logical view of voting equality in a
society committed to universal suffrage.140
133 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (Heightened

scrutiny should be applied to “legislation which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” such as “restrictions
upon the right to vote.”).
134 See Strauss, supra note 85, at 1261 (contending that Reynolds and the
reapportionment cases are amongst the great success stories of Carolene Products).
135 See Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote—One
Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4. Universal white male suffrage was not realized
until the middle of the nineteenth century. Id.
136 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
137 See id. amend. XV, § 1.
138 See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 90 (rev. 2d ed. 2002) (“[B]y the first decade of the twentieth
century, virtually all black voters had been eliminated from the rolls across the South,
through a combination of force and the imposition of restrictive (and often fraudulently
administered) voting qualifications. In Louisiana, for example, there were 127,923 black
voters and 126,884 white voters on the registration rolls in 1888 (the population of the state
was about fifty percent black); by 1910 only 730 blacks (less than 0.5 percent of the adult
male population) were still registered.”).
139 See Auerbach, supra note 135, at 4.
140 As President John F. Kennedy stated, “The right to fair representation and to have
each vote count equally . . . is, it seems to me, basic to the successful operation of a
democracy.” BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME
COURT—A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 425 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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IV. CAN BARNETTE, BROWN, GIDEON, AND REYNOLDS BE RECONCILED
WITH ORIGINALISM?
As discussed in Part III, Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds are not
originalist decisions. Yet all four cases are hailed as among the most important
and foundational decisions in American constitutional history.141 This leads to
two obvious questions: Can these landmark decisions somehow be reconciled
with originalism, and, if not, does the fact that originalism does not support
decisions that lie at the heart of our constitutional understanding suggest that the
interpretive theory is fundamentally flawed? The following subsections discuss
these issues.

A. Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds Are Examples of Judicial
Exceptionalism
A first response might be to argue that Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and
Reynolds and originalism are actually not in conflict and can be reconciled by
an understanding of judicial exceptionalism. For better or worse, in exigent
circumstances, courts are sometimes called upon to do more than apply the
law.142 Judge Posner, for example, has defended Bush v. Gore143 on exactly
these grounds, contending that the Court may have decided to act as it did in
order to avoid the impending chaos that would have faced the nation had the
results of the presidential election continued to remain in doubt.144
If we accept the possibility that courts must or may occasionally act outside
the bounds of legal strictures in order to effectuate “rough justice,”145 to use
141 This is not to say that the cases are free from all criticism. Some have argued, for

example, that Brown may have slowed the progress of civil rights by creating a backlash, see
KLARMAN, supra note 86, at 350; that the promise of equal justice in Gideon remains only a
promise because the courts have failed to assure that court-appointed counsel are actually
effective, see Cole, supra note 94, at 128; that Reynolds’s mathematical reliance on one
person, one vote undermines the ability of the state to protect group interests through the
apportionment process, see Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY
L.J. 869, 883–84 (1995); and that Barnette overstates the limitation on the authority of the
government to promote community hegemony, see Steven D. Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder,
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 630–32 (2003).
142 See William P. Marshall, The Supreme Court, Bush v. Gore, and Rough Justice, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 787, 788–89 (2001).
143 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
144 See Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election
Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 46. As Judge Posner explains, a
continued and unresolved recount would have led to “a real and disturbing potential for
disorder and temporary paralysis.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
145 See id. at 60 (contending that Bush v. Gore may be an example of a case in which the
Court majority may have attempted to achieve “rough justice” rather than strictly applying
legal doctrine). Bush v. Gore may not be the only such example. As I have written
elsewhere, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), might be understood more
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Judge Posner’s term, then an argument could be constructed that originalism
and Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds are reconcilable if the particular
demands of these cases were such that they required the Court to engage in
judicial exceptionalism. If so, the correctness of those cases does not mean that
originalism is invalid. It only means that a court, in exceptional circumstances,
may veer from an otherwise jurisprudentially-sound philosophy.146
Certainly there are reasons that support why a court could believe that
Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds were exceptional cases requiring
extraordinary legal measures. All four cases are, after all, exceptional—
especially Brown—because of their moral and political imperatives.147 Indeed,
that is why they are universally celebrated.148
More specific reasons also support the proposition that these cases raised
particularly compelling reasons for judicial intervention. The malapportionment
addressed in Reynolds, for example, likely never would have been resolved
without judicial review. Political bodies, after all, are unlikely to change the
rules that secure their own entrenchment.149 Brown and Barnette, in turn, had
major implications for United States foreign relations. Brown was arguably
necessary to send a message to the world at the height of the Cold War about
the commitment of the United States to civil liberties and racial justice,150
thereby undercutting Soviet propaganda efforts to bring the third world into its
as an effort of the Court to effectuate rough justice by protecting news media from
debilitating damage verdicts in order to preserve the viability of the civil rights movement in
the South than as a dispassionate First Amendment assessment of libel laws. See Marshall,
supra note 142, at 791–94.
146 Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer make a similar point in reference to
Abraham Lincoln’s rejection of the rule of law in suspending habeas corpus:
If it was important for winning the Civil War that Lincoln suspend habeas corpus and
infringe on other civil liberties, then the moral importance of winning the war was
sufficient to justify his actions. Reaching this conclusion . . . does not mean that
suspending habeas corpus was right. It just means that this wrong was outweighed by
the greater wrong that would have occurred had the war been lost.

Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1382 (1997) (footnote omitted); see also Levinson, supra note 53, at
1135 (discussing the constitutionality of the Emancipation Proclamation).
147 Robert Bork, for example, called Brown “the greatest moral triumph constitutional
law had ever produced.” BORK, supra note 13, at 77. Earl Warren, in turn, stated that
Reynolds, along with Baker v. Carr, were “the most important ones decided during his
sixteen years as the chief justice.” HALL & PATRICK, supra note 63, at 139.
148 See supra Part III.
149 Cf. Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA.
L. REV. 747, 757 (1991) (“It is difficult to imagine a more compelling case for judicial
intervention on political process grounds than [a reapportionment case].”). Klarman’s quote
refers specifically to Baker v. Carr, the pre-Reynolds decision that held apportionment issues
were justiciable. 369 U.S. 186, 203–04 (1962).
150 Cf. Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response
to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232, 1245 (2006).
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orbit.151 Barnette sent the wartime message to World War II allies and enemies
just exactly what was at stake in the conflict: In stark contrast to the totalitarian
practices of Hitler’s Germany, American citizens had the constitutional freedom
to refuse to submit to compelled allegiance.152 In both cases, then, a court might
believe that extraordinary legal action was needed in order to further American
interests abroad at critical moments in American history. Even Gideon
communicated a message of an alternative to a world considering communism
as a method to redress enormous wealth inequalities. As one writer said of
Gideon, “No tale so affirmed the American democracy. No story broadcast
around the world so clearly proclaimed that not just the rich received justice in
American courts.”153
Reconciling Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds with originalism under
a theory of judicial exceptionalism, however, seems awkward. To begin with,
one of the major attractions of originalism is that it rigidly purports not to bend
to the demands of exigency.154 Suggesting that originalism allows for courts to
pursue rough justice, then, is inconsistent with originalism’s basic conviction.
Second, the premise of judicial exceptionalism, in turn, is that it should be
employed in only the rarest of instances.155 Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and
Reynolds, however, cover vast expanses of constitutional law territory. To
contend that those cases stand as exceptions to what constitutional law normally
requires is to suggest that much of constitutional law is based upon exceptions
to what the law actually requires.

B. Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds Are Super Precedents
A second argument might suggest that our four cases and originalism are
not in conflict because their “correctness” is not based upon legal principle but
upon the status that they have attained as precedents.156 That is, the decisions in
the cases may have not been legally correct when decided, but their universal
acceptance ex post makes them unassailable. Viewing the decisions in this
manner brings to mind Michael Gerhardt’s discussion of “super precedents,” or
“foundational decisions,” that are less susceptible to being overruled precisely
151 See KLARMAN, supra note 86, at 291 (“The ensuing Cold War pressured Americans
to reform their racial practices in order to convince nonwhite Third World nations that they
should not equate democratic capitalism with white supremacy.”).
152 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
153 ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 405–06 (1997).
154 See Wilkinson, supra note 40, at 758–60. But see William P. Marshall, The Empty
Promise of Compassionate Conservatism: A Reply to Judge Wilkinson, 90 VA. L. REV. 355,
364–70 (2004) (presenting examples where conservative jurists have bent the rules in order
to reach conservative results).
155 Bush v. Gore, for example, went out of the way to limit the scope of its decision
indicating that the precedential effect of the case might be “limited to the present
circumstances.” See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
156 Indeed, some support for this proposition may be found from the fact that the cases
were not considered uncontroversial when decided.
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because of the special role they play in the constitutional culture.157 Gerhardt
describes the class of super precedents as follows:
Supreme Court decisions on discrete questions of constitutional law that (1)
have endured over time; (2) political institutions repeatedly have endorsed and
supported; (3) have influenced or shaped doctrine in at least one area of
constitutional law; (4) have enjoyed, in one form or another, widespread social
acquiescence; and (5) are widely recognized by the courts as no longer
meriting the expenditure of scarce judicial resources.158

As he explains, such precedents become so deeply enmeshed in the social
landscape, and there has been so much social, political, and economic reliance
upon them, that overturning them, even if it is believed that they were wrongly
decided, becomes “unthinkable.”159
One can debate whether our four cases qualify as super precedent under
Gerhardt’s criteria. Brown (certainly yes), Reynolds (likely yes in some form),
Gideon (maybe), Barnette (maybe not), but the more interesting question is
whether a recognition of these cases as super precedents reconciles them with
originalism. At a superficial level, of course, it does. If cases can be legally
wrong under originalism but still be an accepted part of the constitutional fabric,
then the validity of originalism is not undermined. It just means that “wrong”
cases can be grandfathered in.
Originalists, however, should not be satisfied by this answer.160 Originalism
does not turn out to be much of a constraint if “wrong” decisions can be turned
into correct ones by the virtue of the passage of time or social acceptance, even
if that acceptance becomes deeply ingrained in the constitutional culture.
Furthermore, although the intellectual validity of originalism may not be
undermined by construing the four cases as super precedents, the strength of the
jurisprudential commitment to implementing the theory is weakened by an
account that suggests the theory’s strictures can be effectively bypassed.

157 Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1208–09 (2006).
Gerhardt’s excellent piece also recognizes two other types of super precedent beyond the
foundational decisions discussed below. The first type encompasses cases like Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that establish foundational institutional practices
such as judicial review. Gerhardt, supra, at 1209. The second type encompasses cases that
establish foundational doctrine such as the decisions establishing the incorporation doctrine.
Id. at 1210. His third category, the one of concern here, covers “foundational decisions,”
meaning cases deeply ingrained in political and constitutional culture. Id. at 1213.
158 Gerhardt, supra note 157, at 1213.
159 Id. at 1214. Gerhardt uses the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 457, 553–54
(1871), upholding the constitutionality of paper money, as his prime example for
demonstrating this point. Gerhardt, supra note 157, at 1213–14.
160 Cf. Barnett, supra note 150, at 1233 (arguing that if a case was wrongly decided it
should be overturned no matter how deeply embedded in the culture).
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C. Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds Are Wrong
The final response is the most direct. Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and
Reynolds may be considered hallmark cases, but that is beside the point. What
makes cases right or wrong is not societal acceptance, but correctness as a
matter of law.161 Accordingly, if the cases cannot be justified on originalist
grounds, they must be considered wrong, and their iconic status does not matter.
This is not an insubstantial argument. After all, as Randy Barnett points out,
there have been times in our constitutional history when now-universallycondemned Supreme Court opinions had iconic stature.162 Does that mean that
those cases were legally correct at the time? The difficulty is that if the fact that
a decision is universally engrained in one generation’s political culture makes
that decision legally correct, then any court decision could presumably attain
legally correct status, depending only upon the perception of that decision by
the attendant generation. Stated more simply, if the reason why Brown is
considered legally correct at the beginning of the twenty-first century is because
of its universal societal acceptance, then a case such as Plessy would have to be
considered equally correct at the beginning of the twentieth century, assuming
that the case held similar status during that period.163 Tying the legal
correctness of a decision to universal societal approbation can lead to bad
results as well as good.
All of this, of course, is true. The status of icons can change over time. But
if conservative constitutionalism is to reject cases such as Barnette, Brown,
Gideon, and Reynolds, it must incur a heavy price. First, it must live with the
results. A constitutional landscape that does not prohibit the government from
demanding that its citizens swear oaths of allegiance regardless of their
religious or moral objections, does not outlaw de jure segregation, does not
grant criminal defendants the resources to have a fair trial, and does not provide
each voter with an equal voice in her democratic institutions is a landscape that
is bleak and unforgiving.
Second, originalism must recognize that rejecting these cases means
rejecting the most persuasive accounts (other than an assessment of what the
Framers may have believed) as to what a constitutional provision means.164
Maybe the Equal Protection Clause in 1868, for example, did not mean one
person, one vote, but by the 1960s, the best understanding of voting equality
was precisely that. Perhaps in 1791 compulsory flag salutes would not have
161 Robert Bork explicitly makes this point in The Tempting of America: “It is no answer

to say we like the results . . . , for that is to say that we prefer an authoritarian regime with
which we agree to a democracy which we do not.” BORK, supra note 13, at 78.
162 Barnett, supra note 150, at 1245 (referring to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)).
163 For a discussion of the status of Plessy in American constitutional culture during the
early part of the twentieth century, see KLARMAN, supra note 86, at 22–23.
164 Jeffrey M. Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 83, 85 (2010)
(arguing that originalism leads to anachronistic results).
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been seen to implicate the First Amendment, but by 1943, in the face of
Nazism, that implication was clear. This objection is not, I should point out, an
argument that originalism may lead to bad policy choices. Rather, it is an
argument that originalism may lead to bad legal choices because it forces legal
decisions to be made out of context.
Third, originalism must concede that it projects the Framers in a
surprisingly unfavorable light. To begin with, it suggests that the Framers were
so shortsighted that they would have approved of this bleak constitutional
landscape simply because the society that they lived in did not yet understand
the fuller implications of their (the Framers’) commitment to the principles of
equal protection of the laws, free speech, and the right to counsel that Barnette,
Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds subsequently brought to fruition.165 And it further
ignores that the Framers were steeped in a common law tradition that presumed
that reason, observation, and experience would allow us to increase our
understanding over time about the principles they set forth in the Constitution.
Originalism does all this, moreover, with very little benefit. The perceived
virtue of originalism, of course, is that it ostensibly constrains legal decision
making. But originalism has not proved to be much of a constraining factor. To
begin with, there is little, if any, indication that in the hands of conservative
jurists, originalism has actually served to constrain. The governing rule of
originalism seems only to be that it must be applied rigidly in every case—
except when it isn’t.166
More fundamentally, there is little likelihood that originalism could serve to
substantially constrain even if consistently applied. The Framers, after all, had
no precise agreed-upon meanings of such terms as “freedom of speech,”167 “due
process,”168 “equal protection,”169 Commerce . . . among the several States,”170
or other such provisions.171 Their political beliefs were as diverse as our own,
and the document they produced was a product of compromise, not unanimity.
Originalism thus offers only a false hope of determinacy.172 And that is a very
thin reed upon which to sacrifice cases like Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and
Reynolds.
165 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 886–88 (1985).
166 Marshall, supra note 43, at 1229.
167 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
168 Id. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
169 Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
170 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
171 See Scalia, supra note 13, at 856 (noting that the historical record as to original
meaning is often ambiguous).
172 A prime example of how originalism cannot definitively resolve constitutional issues
is District of Columbia v. Heller, in which both the majority and dissent were able to present
sound historical arguments as to whether the Second Amendment created an individual right
to bear arms. Compare 554 U.S. 570, 598–605 (2008), with id. at 652–62 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Constitutional theory, it is generally agreed, should not be driven by results.
The test of the validity of any constitutional theory should be in its internal
integrity. But what does it say about a constitutional theory if its application
leads to a pattern of results that are problematic? One answer, of course, is to
conclude those results are wrong. The other is to conclude that the pattern of
results stands as evidence that the theory itself is somehow misguided.
Originalism faces a significant challenge under this calculus because so
many of the results to which it leads are inconsistent with decisions that are
considered to be foundational in the American constitutional system including,
as this Article suggests, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
Brown v. Board of Education, Gideon v. Wainwright, and Reynolds v. Sims.
That originalism is at odds with these cases does not definitively prove
originalism to be invalid, although it certainly points in that direction. But it
does demonstrate that the costs of relying on that theory may far exceed its
benefits. Barnette, Brown, Gideon, and Reynolds are iconic for a reason. They
reflect and bring meaning to the Constitution’s fundamental values of equality,
freedom, and democratic participation. They treat the Framers as John Marshall
treated them: as visionaries who authored a Constitution, not scriveners who
drafted a set of rules. Any theory that would excise these decisions from our
constitutional culture must ask, what is left in the vision of the Constitution that
remains?

